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inancial markets have experienced several 
episodes of “liquidity crises” over the past 20 
years. One prominent example is the collapse 
of the Long Term Capital Management hedge 
fund in 1998. The recent market disruption brought 
about by the downturn in subprime mortgages also shares 
many features with liquidity crises. What is liquidity? 
Why does it sometimes seem that the market’s supply 
of it is insufficient? Can anything be done about it? In 
this article, Ronel Elul outlines some theories of market 
liquidity provision, how it breaks down in times of crisis, 
and some possible government responses.
Over the past 20 years, financial 
markets have experienced several 
episodes of “liquidity crises.” Among 
these are the 1998 collapse of the Long 
Term Capital Management hedge fund 
and the disruption in financial markets 
that began in the summer of 2007, 
sparked by the downturn in subprime 
mortgage markets. 
In many of these cases, the 
market’s supply of liquidity seemed 
to be insufficient, and moreover, 
liquidity does not always appear to 
be allocated to those who need it 
most. Lack of liquidity also sometimes 
forces “fire sales,” actions that, in turn, 
push down asset prices, thus making 
liquidity problems worse. Economists 
have sought to understand the nature 
of market liquidity provision, how it 
breaks down in times of crisis, and pos-
sible government responses.1
ANATOMY OF A  
LIQUIDITY CRISIS
What Is Liquidity? One author 
has pointed out that “liquidity, like 
pornography, is easily recognized but 
not so easily defined.”2  For under-
standing liquidity crises, however, it 
may be useful to think of liquidity 
as the ease of selling an asset at its 
“true,” or fundamental, value. This 
fundamental value may be defined as 
the present value of the asset’s future 
cash flows. Alternatively, liquidity can 
be viewed as the extent to which it is 
possible for the holder of an asset to 
borrow against these future cash flows.
The Collapse of LTCM. The 
events of the summer and fall of 1998 
provide an illustration of many of the 
main features of liquidity crises. These 
events revolve around the collapse of 
the Long Term Capital Management 
(LTCM) hedge fund.3 
During the summer of 1998, 
LTCM took large losses on many of 
its trades; these losses were intensified 
when Salomon Smith Barney’s arbi-
trage group, which had positions very 
similar to LTCM’s, was broken up and 
its positions liquidated. But LTCM’s 
position became much more precarious 
on August 17, 1998, when the Russian 
government devalued the ruble and 
declared a moratorium on repaying 281 
billion rubles ($13.5 billion) of its Trea-
sury debt. The fact that the IMF had 
allowed a major economy to default 
shocked the markets.4 
*The views expressed here are those of the au-
thor and do not necessarily represent the views 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or 
the Federal Reserve System.
1 I use the term “government intervention” 
broadly.  In principle, this might include fiscal 
policy or central bank monetary policy.  In this 
paper, I will focus on monetary policy.
2 See the book by Maureen O’Hara.
3 Much of this account is drawn from Roger 
Lowenstein’s book.
4 In addition, a further surprise occurred when 
Russian banks and securities firms exercised 
force majeure clauses and refused to honor the 
derivatives contracts they had sold to foreign 
customers. These clauses, which are common 
in many contracts, are intended to free a party 
from liability when an extraordinary event 
prevents him from fulfilling his obligation.14   Q2  2008 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
LTCM had indeed invested in 
Russian bonds and lost money fol-
lowing this default. However, the 
resulting flight to quality had an even 
bigger effect on the value of LTCM’s 
portfolio. Investors who had become 
nervous as a result of these events 
pulled out of risky assets and rushed 
to assets considered safe. For example, 
the yield on the 30-year U.S. Treasury 
bond (a safe security) fell to its lowest 
level up to that time. Many of LTCM’s 
strategies had involved betting that the 
spread between safe and risky assets 
would actually decline; thus, the flight 
to quality caused it to lose substantially 
more. Finally, in addition to a flight to 
quality in security markets, there was 
a broad-based drying up of liquidity as 
banks chose to preserve their liquidity 
and cut back on lending.5 
As a result of declines in prices on 
the risky assets in its portfolio, LTCM 
breached collateral agreements with 
its lenders and was forced to sell assets 
to meet these margin calls.6  These 
asset sales had ramifications for other 
markets and other hedge funds. Mark 
Mitchell, Lasse Pedersen, and Todd 
Pulvino recount an example: “When 
LTCM incurred large losses on mac-
roeconomic bets, the firm was forced 
to liquidate large convertible bond 
positions.7 These sales led to depressed 
valuations of convertible bonds despite 
the fact there was little change in over-
all fundamentals.8  As a result, other 
hedge funds incurred large losses and 
were also forced to sell their convert-
ible bond holdings.” The authors show 
further that prices of convertible bonds 
fell far below their “fair” value, as cal-
culated by mathematical models.9 
Because of concerns that the 
forced liquidation of LTCM’s huge 
portfolio would cause further upheaval 
in financial markets, the Federal 
Reserve helped coordinate a private-
sector bailout of the fund in September 
1998.10  The Fed also cut its fed funds 
rate target by 75 basis points during 
the fall of 1998, in part because of 
concerns that financial market turmoil 
might spill over to the real side of the 
economy.
From this account we can identify 
several key features of liquidity crises. 
The apparent trigger for the crisis was 
an unexpected event that called long-
standing models into question. Lenders 
responded by cutting back on provid-
ing liquidity. The effect of the crisis 
was to push prices below their funda-
mental, or fair, value. More precisely, 
the prices of risky assets fell, while 
those of assets perceived to be safe 
rose; that is, there was a flight to qual-
ity. There was commonality of illiquid-
ity — problems spilled over from one 
market to another. A liquidity spiral was 
created: These falling prices caused 
margin requirements to be breached, 
thus leading to asset sales, which then 
led to further drops in prices and thus 
to further losses, and so on. Govern-
ment intervention played a role in 
resolving the crisis. 
The Current Financial Market 
Turmoil. Many of these features are 
also present in the disruption in finan-
cial markets that began in the summer 
of 2007, sparked by the downturn in 
subprime mortgage markets. Not sur-
prisingly, the sharp increase in default 
rates on mortgages called into question 
models of subprime mortgage credit 
quality (as well as lenders’ underwrit-
ing standards). There was also a flight 
to quality — for example, the premium 
paid by high-quality (AAA-rated) 
corporate borrowers over U.S. Treasury 
bonds nearly doubled in the summer 
of 2007 (Figure 1). In this case, market 
participants suddenly demanded much 
more compensation to bear even a 
small amount of risk. The cutback in 
the provision of private-sector liquidity 
was even more dramatic than in the 
case of LTCM. This may be seen most 
strikingly in the interbank market; 
the London InterBank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) that banks charge one an-
other in the London interbank market 
5 See, for example, the September 1998 Federal 
Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
snloansurvey/199810/default.htm.
6 Like most hedge funds, LTCM had borrowed 
heavily to finance its portfolio and borrowing 
allowed it to generate higher returns per dollar 
of outside investment. However, LTCM’s lenders 
required that the value of these assets, which 
served as collateral to secure its loans, stay 
above a certain minimum margin requirement. 
When the prices of its assets fell, these collateral 
agreements were breached, and lenders issued 
margin calls. This required LTCM to come up 
with additional cash or securities in order to 
avoid the forced liquidation of its portfolio.
The events of the 
summer and fall of 
1998 provide an 
illustration of many of 
the main features of 
liquidity crises.  
7 A convertible bond is a type of bond that can 
be converted into shares of stock in the issuing 
company, usually at some pre-announced 
ratio. Hedge funds are significant traders of 
convertible bonds, as part of a popular strategy 
known as convertible arbitrage.
8 In this example, prices are below their fair 
value because of binding collateral constraints. 
However, another reason that prices may fall in 
a crisis is that one side of the market has more 
information than the other, and thus, asset 
sales may be interpreted as negative information 
about fundamentals. For a similar model 
motivated by the 1987 stock market crash, 
see the paper by Gerard Gennotte and Hayne 
Leland.
9 The fair value of the convertible bond is 
calculated by using an option valuation model; 
these models are extensions of the well-known 
Black-Scholes pricing formula.
10 Although it will not be discussed here, 
the economic rationale behind the Fed’s 
coordinating role is also of interest; see the 
paper by Stephen Morris and Hyun Shin.   Business Review  Q2  2008   15 www.philadelphiafed.org
shot up relative to the baseline U.S. 
Treasury bill rate as banks sought to 
conserve their scarce liquidity. The 
problems were particularly pronounced 
in term (that is, not overnight) inter-
bank markets (Figure 2). These events 
were widely understood in the popular 
press as reflecting liquidity hoarding. 
Finally, the Federal Reserve and other 
central banks intervened in several 
different ways. (See Federal Reserve Re-
sponses to Recent Problems in Interbank 
Markets.)
PRIVATE MARKETS MAY 
PROVIDE TOO LITTLE 
LIQUIDITY
One central feature of these epi-
sodes is the inadequacy of the private 
market’s provision of liquidity. In 
studying this issue, Bengt Holmstrom 
and Jean Tirole explore various means 
by which firms may obtain liquidity 
and show that the private market may 
not always be able to provide adequate 
liquidity on its own. They then con-
sider possible government responses.
They consider firms that have 
long-lived projects, for example, manu-
facturing plants that can produce a 
good for several years before becoming 
obsolete. These firms may experience 
a “liquidity shock,” a sudden need for 
funds to keep the project going. This 
could be due, for example, to an unan-
ticipated, temporary shortfall in sales, 
so that internal funds that were previ-
ously used to keep projects going are 
no longer available. But if these funds 
are not available, the firms’ assets 
must be liquidated immediately, at a 
loss. How can the firms obtain enough 
liquidity to continue their projects? 
These projects are still profitable, 
so one might think that a firm that has 
been hit by a shock could simply bor-
row against its future project returns. 
But lenders may be unwilling to offer 
sufficient funds to the firm because the 
greater the firm’s required debt pay-
ments, the smaller the firm’s own share 
of the returns from the project. This 
means that the firm has less incentive 
to exert enough effort to ensure that 
the project succeeds. 
To guard against this risk of illi-
quidity, a firm might hold cash or other 
safe assets, such as Treasury securities, 
that can be sold in case it experiences 
a shock. Since these assets are safe, 
the firm can always sell them to raise 
funds. But Holmstrom and Tirole also 
show that this is not generally an ideal 
way to allocate scarce liquidity because 
lucky firms that do not experience a 
shock will be left with assets they do 
not need, while unlucky firms have no 
way to gain access to those assets. 
What is needed instead is some 
way for firms to obtain insurance 
against unexpected liquidity needs. 
This can be facilitated through a 
financial intermediary that can offer 
lines of credit to firms, which they 
draw upon only if they experience a 
shock. In effect, the financial interme-
diary takes stakes in all of the firms’ 
future returns and lends only to those 
firms that have been hit by a shock. 
When liquidity shocks are idiosyn-
cratic — that is, the shock hits only a 
few firms at once — Holmstrom and 
Tirole show that this is indeed the best 
way to provide liquidity to the private 
sector. 
However, in a liquidity crisis, in 
which the liquidity shock is an aggre-
gate one (that is, it hits many firms at 
once — for example, a recession that 
hits all firms’ sales), the private market 
is not able to meet each firm’s liquidity 
needs. The reason is that firms’ aggre-
gate demand for liquidity will exceed 
the private sector’s ability to meet this 
need. In this case, there is scope for 
the government to provide liquidity in 
times of crisis. The government is able 
to commit to providing liquidity when 
FIGURE 1
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the private market can’t, either by tax-
ing consumers or by printing money. 
Holmstrom and Tirole sug-
gest that this intervention may take 
many forms. For example, it could 
take the form of government securi-
ties that pay off only in the event of a 
particular aggregate liquidity shock. 
Sundaresan and Wang document this 
in connection with the run-up to Y2K. 
They show that privately supplied 
liquidity dried up as the millennium 
approached. In response, the Federal 
Reserve intervened by issuing options 
on the fed funds rate.11 Alternatively, 
Holmstrom and Tirole suggest that 
monetary policy could serve this role 






While Holmstrom and Tirole 
focus on the lack of sufficient liquid-
ity in the private sector as a rationale 
for government intervention, another 
feature of some liquidity crises is that 
what liquidity is available is not ef-
ficiently allocated. That is, liquidity is 
not allocated to those who need it the 
most. The reason is that the liquidity 
crisis may make market participants 
overly concerned about extremely 
unlikely risks and lead them to hoard 
liquidity so as to insure against these 
risks. 
Ricardo Caballero and Arvind 
Krishnamurthy study this phenom-
enon and show how government 
intervention may be useful in resolving 
it. They focus on liquidity crises that 
begin with unexpected events that call 
widely held beliefs and models into 
question. We have seen that this may 
characterize both the 1998 LTCM col-
lapse as well as the recent disruption in 
financial markets that began with the 
downturn in subprime mortgage mar-
kets. Having scrapped old models, but 
without well-articulated new models to 
take their place, investors may tie up 
so much capital in response to con-
cerns about extreme — but unlikely 
— events that they are unwilling to 
provide financing to meet more moder-
ate — but likelier — liquidity needs.
Consider the example of corpora-
tions that deposit funds in a bank and, 
in return, have access to lines of credit 
that they can draw on should they ex-
perience a liquidity shock. In Caballero 
and Krishnamurthy’s model, a sudden 
liquidity shock hits some firms in the 
economy and generates a need for bor-
rowing. But those firms not affected by 
this first shock grow concerned that 
they may be hit by a second shock, 
even though this second shock is very 
unlikely.  The unaffected firms react 
by preemptively drawing down their 
own lines of credit.12  That is, they 
hoard liquidity. The result is that there 
is much less available for those firms 
that actually need liquidity because 
they have been hit by the first shock. 
Reports in the popular press 
during the recent financial market 
disruption frequently refer to liquidity 
hoarding motivated by uncertainty. For 
example, in explaining elevated inter-
11 These options, which were sold to Treasury 
bond dealers, each gave the holder the right 
to borrow $50 million from the Fed at a 
pre-specified interest rate, on a specific date 
between December 23, 1999, and January 12, 
2000. The Fed also responded in other ways, 
for example, by creating a “century date change 
special liquidity facility” for banks.
FIGURE 2
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12 Firms may act preemptively because they are 
concerned that when the second shock hits, 
their credit quality will deteriorate so much that 
they will violate the covenants in their lines of 
credit and, thus, will be unable to borrow any 
further.
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est rates in the interbank market, the 
Wall Street Journal quoted one banker 
as saying that “[banks and investors] 
are still fearful of each other and ev-
erybody is worried about counterparty 
risk and so people are hoarding their 
balance sheets.”13  This article also sug-
gested that government intervention 
might reassure market participants and 
so reduce the impetus to hoard liquid-
ity. We will see that, in Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy’s model, government 
intervention can play such a role.
But why would banks hoard 
capital in response to an unforeseen 
shock? Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
assume that market participants are 
uncertainty averse. That is, when evalu-
ating outcomes about which they are 
uncertain, they use the most pessimistic 
probability assessments. In particular, 
each participant overweights the prob-
ability that he will be among those hit 
by the second shock. (See Uncertainty 
Aversion.) This creates a desire to 
hoard liquidity against this unlikely 
shock. 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
then discuss how government inter-
vention might remedy this market 
failure. Their prescription is for the 
government to act as a lender of last 
resort. More precisely, by committing 
to provide liquidity in the event that 
the second shock occurs, the govern-
ment thereby frees the private market 
to insure itself against the first, more 
likely, shock. Indeed, Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy quote former Fed 
Chairman Alan Greenspan to this 
effect: “‘... [p]olicy practitioners operat-
ing under a risk-management paradigm 
may, at times, be led to undertake 
actions intended to provide insurance 
against especially adverse outcomes.’” 
LIQUIDITY AND ASSET PRICES
We have seen that one way for 
firms to generate liquidity in times of 
need is to sell assets. But the level of 
liquidity can affect the value of these 
assets. This can then result in a “spi-
ral,” in which falling liquidity reduces 
asset values, which, in turn, leads to 
lower liquidity, and so on.14 We have 
already discussed one example of this: 
the convertible bond market during 
the 1998 collapse of LTCM. These 
forced sales, Mitchell, Pedersen, and 
Pulvino argue, were the result of bind-
ing capital constraints. 
Markus Brunnermeier and Lasse 
Pedersen develop a model that explains 
these spirals, along with many other 
features of liquidity crises. They focus 
on a particular aspect of liquidity: the 
need for immediacy. In their model a 
customer may arrive with an immedi-
ate need to sell an asset today, but 
no buyer may be available. So there 
is a need for temporary liquidity to 
bridge this gap (what they term market 
liquidity). This need for immediacy is 
provided by speculators (for example, 
securities dealers or hedge funds). The 
speculators serve a valuable economic 
role: They buy the asset today and 
then sell it at some later date when a 
buyer arrives. The speculators require 
funds in order to operate, and they 
obtain these funds from financiers, for 
example, banks. So they themselves 
also have a need for liquidity. Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen call this funding 
liquidity. 
In normal times, financiers them-
selves have adequate funding liquid-
ity; therefore, they are able to provide 
market liquidity to their customers and 
thus assets are priced “fairly.” That is, 
the price of an asset accurately reflects 
its expected future cash flows. How-
ever, when funding liquidity is scarce, 
there will also be insufficient market 
liquidity, and asset prices will need 
to fall below this fair value to induce 
speculators to buy. 
But why would funding liquidity 
be scarce? One reason is that specula-
tors may have incurred losses on their 
other activities (as LTCM did). In 
addition, falling prices can themselves 
negatively affect speculators’ funding 
liquidity. The reason is that speculators 
are limited in how much they can bor-
row by a collateral constraint.15  That 
Falling liquidity reduces asset values, which,
in turn, leads to lower liquidity.
13 See the article by Greg Ip and Joellen Perry. 
14 The feedback between asset values and 
financing conditions has also been explored by 
macroeconomists seeking to explain the depth 
and persistence of economic downturns. An 
early and influential example is Irving Fisher’s 
“debt deflation” theory of the Great Depression.
 
15 Brunnermeier and Pedersen model this as a 
maximal value-at-risk (VaR) for the speculators. 
Banks commonly use value-at-risk to measure 
market risk, both for themselves and for their 
counterparties. Indeed, the Basel II Accord — 
an international agreement regarding how much 
capital banks need to put aside to guard against 
financial and operational risks — encourages 
the use of VaR to determine the amount of 
regulatory capital a bank must hold against its 
market risk. In the Basel II framework, VaR is 
calculated using a 10-day horizon, at a 1 percent 
probability level. So if a bank’s market risk 
model predicts that there is only a 1 percent 
chance that the value of its portfolio will 
decline by more than $1 million in the next 10 
days, its VaR is $1 million. VaR thus depends 
critically on the volatility of the value of the 
assets. In Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s model 
this goes up in a crisis because price declines 
make the world appear to be more volatile. 18   Q2  2008 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
Federal Reserve Responses to Recent Problems in Financial Markets
s of March 2008, the Federal Reserve has 
responded in several ways to the liquidity 
problems associated with the recent 
disruptions in financial markets. These 
interventions provide examples of the 
policy instruments available to central banks.
• Discount Window – The Fed took two broad classes 
of actions to ease disruptions in financial markets 
by making it less costly for depository institutions to 
borrow directly from the Fed through the discount 
window. The discount window offers some advantages 
over private markets during episodes of tight credit. 
First, the Fed accepts a wider variety of collateral 
than do bank lenders (particularly during periods 
of financial market turmoil). In addition, by lending 
directly to depository institutions, the Fed can 
supplement the interbank market at times when it is 
not functioning well.a  However, depository institutions 
are often reluctant to borrow directly from the Fed 
because of the perceived stigma it carries. 
One step the Fed took was to narrow the spread 
between the discount rate (which is the rate that 
depository institutions must pay to borrow directly 
from the Fed’s primary credit facility) and the federal 
funds rate (the rate at which banks borrow and 
lend among themselves, for one day at a time, on 
an unsecured basis). It also extended the terms of 
discount window loans; before the summer of 2007 
they were overnight or very short-term loans. The 
Fed did this in two stages: On September 18, 2007, 
the Fed reduced the spread from 100 basis points 
above the target fed funds rate to 50 basis points and 
extended the maturity of discount window loans to up 
to 30 days. On March 16, 2008, it lowered the spread 
further, to 25 basis points, and also extended the 
maximum maturity of discount window loans to 90 
days. 
• Term Auction Facility (TAF) – This was a new policy 
tool announced on December 12, 2007. The Fed 
undertook to make 28-day loans directly to depository 
institutions at rates determined through competitive 
auctions. From these institutions’ perspective, the TAF 
has several potential advantages over the discount 
window. One is that borrowing from the TAF may 
carry less of a stigma for a depository institution than 
accessing the discount window. In addition, depository 
institutions were able to place bids below the discount 
rate, so that they had the possibility of receiving 
funding at lower rates. While the TAF was new for 
the Fed, the European Central Bank regularly uses a 
similar tool.
• Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) – On March 
16, 2008, the Fed announced the PDCF, which is a 
new, temporary discount window facility. The PDCF 
provides overnight funding to primary dealersb at the 
discount rate, in exchange for a specified range of 
collateral, including investment-grade mortgage-backed 
securities and asset-backed securities. This facility is 
intended to improve the primary dealers’ ability to 
provide financing to participants in securitization 
markets and promote the orderly functioning of 
financial markets more generally.
• 28-Day Single-Tranche Repurchase Agreements – On 
March 7, 2008, the Federal Reserve announced that it 
would initiate a series of term repurchase agreementsc 
that are expected to cumulate to $100 billion. There 
A
a Recall that there was a particularly large spread between LIBOR and Treasury rates, suggesting that there were indeed problems in the interbank 
market.
b Primary government securities dealers (primary dealers) - of which there are 20 - are banks or securities broker-dealers who may trade directly with 
the Fed. They are active participants in the Fed’s open market operations as well as in U.S. Treasury auctions. Several of these are investment banks, 
and many others are subsidiaries of commercial banks. The current list of primary dealers may be found at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/
pridealers_current.html.
c A repurchase agreement (or “repo”) is a collateralized borrowing agreement structured as a sale of the collateral (in this case by dealers to the Fed), 
along with an agreement to buy it back at a higher price in the future (in this case, 28 days later). This higher price implicitly determines an interest 
rate, known as the “repo rate.”
d Although these 28-day single tranche repos differ from the ones typically conducted by the Fed, in the past the Fed has occasionally conducted 
either 28-day, or single-tranche, repos.is, the speculators must post securi-
ties to back any loan they take. (See 
Margins and Liquidity.) This collateral 
constraint becomes tighter during a 
crisis for two reasons. First, the value 
of the collateral is lower in the crisis, 
because asset prices have fallen. In 
addition, falling prices make the 
world appear more volatile, which also 
leads the bank to tighten its collateral 
constraint. This results in a liquidity 
spiral, as described above.
In addition to liquidity spirals, 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen are able 
to explain other characteristic fea-
tures of liquidity crises. The first is 
the flight to quality: a rush to buy safe 
assets, which is reflected in a relative 
appreciation in their price. This is an 
outcome of Brunnermeier and Peder-
sen’s model because when liquidity is 
scarce, market participants prefer to 
conserve it by investing in less risky 
assets. This causes the price of riskier 
assets to fall more than those of safe 
ones (and hence causes their yield 
to rise relative to that of safe assets). 
Another feature that Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen are able to explain is the 
commonality of liquidity across securi-
ties and markets, that is, the tendency 
for liquidity problems to spread from 
one market to another (as was the 
case for the convertible bond market 
in 1998, discussed earlier). This occurs 
because speculators provide liquidity 
in many markets simultaneously, and 
so a deterioration in their financing 
position (even if initially caused by a 
shock to a single market) will affect all 
of these markets.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
also discuss the possible regulatory 
responses to a crisis. First, they argue 
that if the regulator “knows” that this 
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are two main differences between these agreementsd 
and typical Fed repurchase agreements.  First, they 
are 28-day repos; typically the term is shorter. In 
addition, they are “single-tranche”: dealers may submit 
any of the following types of collateral — Treasuries, 
agency debt, and agency mortgage-backed securities 
— and pay the same repo rate regardless of its type. 
By contrast, the repo rate typically differs by the type 
of collateral, with those pledging Treasuries paying 
the lowest rate and those pledging mortgage-backed 
securities the highest. Since under the new program 
market participants face the same rate regardless of 
the collateral, they have an incentive to submit only 
mortgage-backed securities.e 
• Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) – On March 
11, 2008, the Fed announced an expansion of its 
securities lending program. Under the new program, 
the Term Securities Lending Facility, the Federal 
Reserve will lend up to $200 billion of Treasury 
securities to primary dealers for a term of 28 days 
(rather than overnight, as in the existing program) by 
a pledge of other securities, including federal agency 
debt and both agency and AAA-rated nonagency 
mortgage-backed securities. The TSLF is intended to 
promote liquidity in the financing markets for Treasury 
and other collateral and thus to foster the orderly 
functioning of financial markets more generally.
• Cooperation with Other Central Banks – Other central 
banks also undertook to increase their liquidity 
provision through similar means. In addition, the Fed 
entered into “reciprocal currency arrangements,” in 
which it lent dollars to the European Central Bank and 
the Swiss National Bank, which, in turn, offered dollar 
loans to their member banks. This was the first time 
since September 11, 2001, that the Fed had entered 
into such arrangements with central banks in Europe.
This period was also characterized by a slowing economy 
and by concerns that continued financial market turmoil 
could slow the real economy further. In response, the 
Fed reduced its target for the fed funds rate. Between 
September 2007 and March 2008, the Fed cuts its target 
from 5.25 percent to 2.25 percent
Federal Reserve Responses ... continued
e That this was in fact the case can be seen from the New York Fed’s announcements of the results of its single-tranche repos on March 7, 11, 18, 
and 25, 2008.20   Q2  2008 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
is, in fact, a temporary liquidity shock, 
he should try to convince banks to 
lend to speculators. If the regulator 
is correct, banks’ profits in times of 
crisis will actually be higher. However, 
attributing superior information to the 
regulator is, of course, a very strong 
assumption. In addition, Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen suggest that the regulator 
can help stabilize prices by providing 
liquidity directly to the speculators (or 
to the banks that finance them). 
CONCLUSION
Financial intermediaries serve to 
allocate the private market’s wealth 
so as to meet firms’ and investors’ 
liquidity needs. But “liquidity crises,” 
in which the market fails to function 
properly, are a recurrent feature of 
financial markets.
During these episodes the demand 
for liquidity may be so great that it 
cannot be met by the private sector 
alone. This creates a role for govern-
ment intervention; the government 
can provide liquidity in these circum-
stances through its ability to raise 
funds by taxing consumers.
In addition, these episodes may 
also be characterized by a misalloca-
tion of private liquidity. Market partici-
pants may hoard liquidity because they 
become concerned about extremely 
unlikely events. In this case there may 
be a further role for the government in 
insuring against these extreme events. 
icardo Caballero and Arvind Krish-
namurthy use uncertainty aversion in 
their model to explain the hoarding of 
liquidity. There is evidence that decisions 
are indeed characterized by aversion to 
uncertainty; that is, individuals seek to 
avoid ambiguous situations in which probabilities are not 
known. A classic example is the Ellsberg paradox. 
In the Ellsberg paradox, there is an urn contain-
ing 90 balls: 30 red balls and 60 black and yellow balls in 
unknown proportion. A ball is drawn, and an individual 
is then asked whether he prefers to bet that this ball is 
red (gamble A) or black (gamble B). Most people choose 
gamble A. That is, they prefer to bet on a red ball, which 
they know will occur one-third of the time, against the 
chance of a black ball, whose probability lies somewhere 
between 0 and two-thirds. Note that gamble B reflects 
uncertainty, in that the precise probability that a ball is 
black is unknown.
Then the ball is replaced and another is drawn. 
The (same) individual is now asked whether he prefers 
to bet that the ball is either red or yellow (gamble C) or 
black or yellow (D). Most people choose gamble D in this 
case. That is, they prefer to bet that a black or yellow ball 
is drawn, which they know will happen two-thirds of the 
time, against the chance of a red or yellow ball (the latter 
probability lies somewhere between one-third and 1).
But there is a certain inconsistency in these two 
choices because the second gamble is really equivalent to 
the first, with the addition of the possibility of yellow balls 
to each option. So if someone prefers gamble A over B, he 
should actually prefer gamble C over D. For example, if 
one believes there are more red balls than black balls (and 
hence prefers gamble A over B), one also believes that 
there are more red or yellow balls than black or yellow 
balls, and so should prefer gamble C over D.
Ellsberg explained these seemingly contradictory 
choices as reflecting individuals’ dislike for uncertainty, 
that is, for unknown probabilities. They prefer A over B 
because they know that one-third of the balls are red; 
conversely, they prefer D over B because they know that 
two-thirds of the balls are either black or yellow.
Since this evidence is inconsistent with the canoni-
cal economic model of expected utility maximization,* 
it has led to the development of alternative models of 
decision-making under uncertainty. One of these, de-
veloped by Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler, models 
individuals faced with unknown probabilities as pessimis-
tic – that is, as making decisions under the “worst case” 




* In particular, the “sure-thing principle.”  Business Review  Q2  2008   21 www.philadelphiafed.org
n Markus Brunnermeier and Lasse Ped-
ersen’s model, margin requirements play 
a key role. They may exacerbate liquidity 
crises and thus facilitate a liquidity spiral. 
Likewise, Mark Mitchell, Pedersen, and 
Todd Pulvino document the role that 
capital constraints have played in many real-life liquidity 
crises (for example, in the convertible bond market in the 
1998 LTCM crisis). Given that they may exacerbate cri-
ses, why do margin requirements and capital constraints 
exist? And are they optimally determined by private 
markets?
On the most basic level, requiring borrowers to post 
margin, or collateral, facilitates lending by increasing the 
likelihood that lenders will be repaid.a  Viral Acharya 
and S. Viswanathan show how this can help to provide 
liquidity. Consider firms facing liquidity shocks. If they 
are able to borrow enough, they can meet their liquidity 
needs without selling any assets. However, firms may 
be limited in what they can borrow because lenders 
are concerned that the firm might divert funds to risky 
projects. In general, borrowers have a tendency to prefer 
riskier projects than their lenders because lenders bear the 
brunt of any losses when the firm defaults. By pledging 
their assets as collateral, firms are able to reassure lenders 
that they will indeed invest efficiently; so firms are able to 
borrow more and thus meet larger liquidity needs. 
While collateral does facilitate borrowing, if the 
liquidity shock is large, not all firms will be able to borrow 
enough to survive, and some will need to be liquidated 
early. In cases where there are many more sellers than 
buyers, this will, in turn, lower asset prices. These lower 
prices then lead to tighter collateral constraints and thus 
to a liquidity spiral, as described earlier.
Although Acharya and Viswanathan show that the 
ability to post collateral is valuable to society, does it 
follow that the private market sets collateral requirements 
optimally? In a different model, John Geanakoplos and 
Felix Kubler present an example suggesting that this is 
not always the case.b  They show that margins may be too 
loose in good times and too tight in crises because lenders 
do not take into account the effect that the margins they 
set have on market prices. So there may also be a role 
for government regulation of margin requirements (such 
a view was also recently expressed by former Treasury 
Secretary Robert Rubin). Indeed, Geanakoplos and 
Kubler suggest that margins may be too loose in good 
times, since lenders do not realize that their lending 
increases the risk of a future crisis; conversely, margins 
may be too tight in crises, since increasing lending would 
raise prices and thereby ease the crisis. The extent to 
which this intuition can be generalized is unclear, and 
further research in this area would be valuable.
Margins and Liquidity
I
This frees up the private markets’ 
liquidity and allows it to be used more 
effectively.
Another feature of liquidity crises 
is the interaction between liquidity 
and asset prices. A lack of liquidity 
can lower asset prices below their fair, 
or fundamental, value. Since liquidity 
is often obtained by using these assets 
as collateral for loans, this in turn 
can lead to lower liquidity provision. 
The outcome is a “liquidity spiral,” 
in which the resulting illiquidity can 
lower asset prices even further, and so 
on. Further research is needed on this 
role of collateral in providing liquidity 
and, in particular, on the question of 
whether government intervention can 
improve on the private market’s use of 
collateral. B R
a For more on the economic role of collateral, see the article by Yaron Leitner.
b See also the presentation by John Geanakoplos at the Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum.REFERENCES
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